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The accident at Japan's Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant in March 2011, caused by
an earthquake and a subsequent tsunami, resulted in a failure of the power systems that
are needed to cool the reactors at the plant. The accident progression in the absence of heat
removal systems caused Units 1-3 to undergo fuel melting. Containment pressurization
and hydrogen explosions ultimately resulted in the escape of radioactivity from reactor
containments into the atmosphere and ocean. Problems in containment venting operation,
leakage from primary containment boundary to the reactor building, improper functioning
of standby gas treatment system (SGTS), unmitigated hydrogen accumulation in the
reactor building were identified as some of the reasons those added-up in the severity of
the accident. The Fukushima accident not only initiated worldwide demand for installation
of adequate control and mitigation measures to minimize the potential source term to the
environment but also advocated assessment of the existing mitigation systems perfor-
mance behavior under a wide range of postulated accident scenarios. The uncertainty in
estimating the released fraction of the radionuclides due to the Fukushima accident also
underlined the need for comprehensive understanding of fission product behavior as a
function of the thermal hydraulic conditions and the type of gaseous, aqueous, and solid
materials available for interaction, e.g., gas components, decontamination paint, aerosols,
and water pools. In the light of the Fukushima accident, additional experimental needs
identified for hydrogen and fission product issues need to be investigated in an integrated
and optimized way. Additionally, as more and more passive safety systems, such as pas-
sive autocatalytic recombiners and filtered containment venting systems are being retro-
fitted in current reactors and also planned for future reactors, identified hydrogen and
fission product issues will need to be coupled with the operation of passive safety systems
in phenomena oriented and coupled effects experiments. In the present paper, potential
hydrogen and fission product issues raised by the Fukushima accident are discussed. The
discussion focuses on hydrogen and fission product behavior inside nuclear power plant96 936 100.
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Nu c l E n g T e c h n o l 4 7 ( 2 0 1 5 ) 1 1e2 512containments under severe accident conditions. The relevant experimental investigations
conducted in the technical scale containment THAI (thermal hydraulics, hydrogen, aero-
sols, and iodine) test facility (9.2 m high, 3.2 m in diameter, and 60 m3 volume) are dis-
cussed in the light of the Fukushima accident.
Copyright © 2015, Published by Elsevier Korea LLC on behalf of Korean Nuclear Society.1. Introduction
The Fukushima Daiichi accident in Japan occurred on March
11, 2011 due to common-cause failure resulting from an
earthquake and a massive tsunami. The natural event that
exceeded the design basis conditions resulted in loss of heat
removal systems and subsequently led to core melting and a
large release of radioactivematerials to the environment [1,2].
The consequences from the Fukushima accident confirmed
that adequate defense-in-depth safety measures are neces-
sary to protect a nuclear power plant (NPP) against low prob-
ability/high consequence events. The Fukushima Daiichi
accident resulted inworldwide concern to ensure the safety of
nuclear installations [3e6].
The Tokyo Electric Power Company Fukushima Daiichi
Facility consisted of six boilingwater reactors (BWRs) supplied
by General Electric with Mark 1 containment system design
for Units 1-5 and Mark 2 design for Unit 6 [1]. In Mark 1
containment system design, the primary containment
consists of a drywell, the reactor pressure vessel, and a torus
shaped pressure suppression water pool housed within
wetwell, and a network of vents connecting the drywell to
the pressure suppression pool. The drywell and wetwell
have the same design pressure. The primary containment
resides within the reactor building that also houses spent
fuel pool and emergency core cooling systems [7].
At the time of the accident, Units 1-3 were in operation at a
constant rated electric power. The reactor at Unit 4 was on
refueling outage, and all of its fuel had been offloaded to the
spent fuel pool. Reactor Units 5 and 6 were in a planned
shutdown for maintenance. Soon after the earthquake
occurred, automatic scrams initiated for Units 1-3 began a
sequence designed to shut down the reactors safely. However,
when the tsunami hit the site, all the safety systems that
started after the earthquake and relied on electrical power to
meet their function to protect and cool the fuel in the reactor
cores at Units 1-3 failed [1,2]. In the absence of adequate heat
removal systems to take away the decay heat from the reactor
core, a substantial amount of steam was produced and
released into the dry primary containment through safety
valves. Steam release was later accompanied by hydrogen.
Production of noncondensable gases, such as hydrogen,
added to the pressure build-up inside the primary contain-
ment and therefore venting operations were deemed neces-
sary to keep pressure within design limits. Problems in
containment venting operation, leakage from primary
containment boundary to the reactor building, improper
functioning of standby gas treatment system (SGTS), unmiti-
gated hydrogen accumulation in the reactor building were
identified as some of the potential reasons those added-up in
the severity of the accident.In the case of a “station blackout” scenario, Mark 1
containment system design has provisions to mitigate
hydrogen risks and fission product release to the environ-
ment. The decay heat from the reactor core can be removed by
discharging steam to the suppression pool. Pressure sup-
pression pool also filters out radioactive fission products and
thus reduces potential source-term to the environment.
However, suppression pool capacitymay also be limited in the
long term due to the continuous input of high temperature
steam and if the AC power has not been recovered for
necessary cooling operation. At high suppression pool tem-
peratures (around 90 C) dynamic condensation loads may
cause loss of suppression pool integrity [7]. Furthermore,
saturated water pools become ineffective in capturing the
fission products by means of steam condensation. As Mark 1
primary containment (drywell and wetwell) are inerted by
nitrogen, hydrogen explosion is not considered a likely
failure mode [7]. For measures against a hydrogen explosion
inside reactor buildings, no considerations for hydrogen
monitoring and hydrogen mitigation have been reported to
be existent in the affected Fukushima Units 1-4.
In the aftermath of the Fukushima accident, several review
committees were set up and stress tests were carried out at
national and international levels. The results of these stress
tests and suggestions by review committees served as a basis
for making proposals to take corrective measures [8e12].
Some of these proposed measures have been specific to
hydrogen and fission product issues and put emphases on;
real-time monitoring of hydrogen concentration to allow
effective mitigation measures in the short term, measures
against hydrogen explosion in primary and secondary con-
tainments and measures to reduce radionuclide release into
the environment.
The Fukushima accident confirmed that same level of de-
fense-in-depth safetymeasures are necessary for primary and
secondary containments (reactor building) and preinerting of
a BWR primary containment is not a sufficient mitigation
measure to protect containments against hydrogen explo-
sions. Therefore, action plans prepared by regulatory bodies in
many countries included directives to install supplementary
mitigation measures to tackle hydrogen threat and fission
product release potential in primary containment as well as in
the reactor building [12e16].
Hydrogenmitigation systembased on passive autocatalytic
recombiners (PAR) are considered to be effective for a wide
range of accident scenarios including station blackout as they
do not require any active power for operation and recombine
hydrogen with available oxygen in the presence of a catalyst.
PAR based hydrogen mitigation system is already one of the
established strategies for hydrogen mitigation in Pressurized
Water Reactor (PWR) containments [17]. In some countries
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to tackle hydrogen threat either by recombining hydrogen in
air-filled drywell or by consuming available oxygen inside
inerted drywell or wetwell atmospheres [18]. In the light of
the Fukushima accident, additional experimental PAR data
for BWR specific conditions will be necessary to enhance the
prediction capability of safety analysis tools. Some of the
parameters of interest specific to BWR application, e.g. effect
of very low oxygen concentration on PAR start-up and
recombination efficiency and PAR ignition potential in
oxygen lean atmosphere have been investigated in the frame
of concluded OECD/NEA joint projects THAI and THAI2
[19,20]. Nevertheless, considering PAR application in reactor
building, still some uncertainties exist related to PAR
performance under adverse flow conditions which might be
expected during uncontrolled release into reactor building,
effect of admixtures (e.g. carbon monoxide, fission products,
potential poisons), and PAR induced hydrogen deflagration
behaviour after continuous exposure to elevated hydrogen
concentration. Moreover, detailed understanding of gas
distribution will be necessary particularly for multi-
compartment geometry with different thermal-hydraulic
conditions. Experimental investigations also need to
consider steam induced two-phase phenomena which might
influence the flow behavior by condensation and/or
evaporation in the gas atmosphere or on the containment
walls. The flow distribution studies need to be coupled with
fission products due to the fact that independent thermal-
hydraulic conditions prevailing in different compartments
and condensation behavior on walls (liquid films or rivulets)
or in volume (e.g. spray) might have significant influence on
fission product distribution and behavior inside a
containment building.
Regarding reduction of potential fission products release to
the environment, plans prepared by regulatory bodies in
many countries include directives to assess the NPPs accident
management provisions and important severe accident phe-
nomena related to aerosol and iodine release and retention.
The requirement has re-initiated research activities related to
pool scrubbing in BWR suppression pools and performance
analysis of filtration system for containment depressurization
at both the national and international levels. The reason to
initiate these research activities has been on one hand to
prepare and enhance the technical/experimental basis for
installing the filtered venting systems or to develop new
filtration technologies according to specific reactor re-
quirements and on the other hand to reassess the potential of
aerosol and iodine retention in BWR suppressions pools
[14e16,21,22].
The need for further severe accident research is also
backed-up by the fact that there exist only a few experimental
data for systematic validation of safety analysis codes related
to, for example, hydrogen distribution and combustion
behavior, especially for BWR-specific gas release scenarios
from primary containment to the reactor building, PAR per-
formance under BWR building environmental conditions, pool
scrubbing phenomena, and FCVS performance assessment
under Fukushima-relevant accidental conditions.
After the Fukushima accident, it became evident that the
approach for risk assessment and management, which areessential elements in ensuring nuclear safety, will require a
wider perspective. The accident scenarios, such as potential of
hydrogen explosion outside BWRs primary containment or
observed migration of hydrogen from Unit 3 to Unit 4, will
need to be considered in order to improve safety for nuclear
facilities worldwide.2. THAI test facility: thermal hydraulics,
hydrogen, aerosols, and iodine
THAI (thermal hydraulics, hydrogen, aerosols, and iodine) is a
containment test facility located at Eschborn, Germany. The
main component of the facility is a 60m3 stainless steel vessel,
22 mm wall thickness, 9.2 m high, and 3.2 m in diameter,
pressure up to 1.4 MPa at temperatures up to 180 C, with
exchangeable internals for multi-compartment investigations
(Fig. 1).
The vessel structures are made of stainless steel (AISI
316Ti). The cylindrical part of the THAI vessel wall consists
of a 22 mm thick inner wall and 6 mm thick outer wall,
with thermal oil between, forming three in-dependent
heating/cooling jackets over the height for controlled wall
temperature conditioning by means of external thermal oil
circuits. The heating/cooling power of each jacket is deter-
mined from measurements of oil mass flow and inlet/outlet
temperature difference. The sump water basin of the
THAI vessel has a diameter of 1.4 m and is equipped with a
20-kW electrical heating coil. The outer sides of the vessel
including the heating/cooling jackets are thermally well
isolated with mineral wool. Operation of the three heating/
cooling jackets and/or controlled injection of steam and gas
allow establishing either a thermally stratified atmosphere
within the vessel volume or atmosphere mixing by natural
convection.
A large top flange and two manholes provide access to
the interior of the vessel for modifications of internals and
instrumentation. Flanges on five levels at five circumferential
positions allow installation of in-situ optical (particle image
velocimetry, laser Doppler velocimetry, diode laser, etc.)
and other conventional instrumentation, and of sampling
lines for gas concentration measurements. The standard
configuration of the removable inner vessel structures and a
typical arrangement of the instrumentation can be seen in
Fig. 1B.
Experimental configuration and operating conditions in
the THAI vessel typical of those for PWR or BWR can be pro-
duced thanks to its modular structure, appropriate feeding/
generation devices for gases (H2, He, O2, steam, N2, etc.),
aerosol (inert and hygroscopic), iodine-123 radiotracer, and
advanced instrumentation. The THAI facility is equippedwith
various aerosol generation techniques to produce severe ac-
cident prototypical aerosol particles (CsI, Ag, LiNO3, SnO2,
etc.) at specified thermal-hydraulic conditions and aerosol
mass concentration in the range of 1 to 4 g/m3. Experimental
investigations cover various mitigation systems employed in
LWR containments, e.g., suppression pool hydrodynamics,
performance behavior of PAR and spray interaction with
hydrogen-steam-air deflagrations in phenomenon orientated
experiments [23,24].
Fig. 1 e THAI test facility (A) THAI facility including its auxiliary rooms and accessories provided for the application of
radioactive I-123 tracer for iodine distribution measurements. (B) Close-up of THAI vessel with removable internals. THAI,
thermal hydraulics, hydrogen, aerosols, and iodine.
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3.1. Hydrogen issues
In case of a severe reactor accident, hydrogen gas can be
generated by metal-water reaction and core-concrete inter-
action in the short term, and by water radiolysis in the long
term. Released into an air-filled atmosphere, hydrogen forms
flammable or even detonablemixtures, thus posing a threat to
the integrity of the containment and to safety-relevant
equipment. Adequate prevention and mitigation measures to
reduce the probability of containment failure due to pressure
and thermal loads associated with a hydrogen explosion
require detailed information on hydrogen generation rate,
temporal and spatial distribution within multi-compartment
containment structure, and hydrogen combustion behaviour
under a range of thermal hydraulic conditions during a hy-
pothetical severe accident. Additionally, as more and more
passive safety systems for hydrogen removal are being
installed in current reactors and also planned for future re-
actors, the aforesaid issues need to be coupled with the
operation of such passive safety systems in phenomena-ori-
ented experiments.
The quantity and rate of production, the place of genera-
tion, and the distribution pathways of hydrogen are strongly
dependent on the particular accident scenario and on the
containment geometry. In-vessel hydrogenmass produced by
assuming oxidation of 100% of zirconium mass is expected to
be in the range of 3,000e4,000 kg in a typical BWR (2,800MWth)
reactor compared to at least 3-4 times less for a typical PWR
(3,600 MWth) [25]. In the absence of an adequate mitigation
measure, release of such large quantities of hydrogen to an
atmosphere containing air can result into violent hydrogendeflagration or even transition to a detonation. Obviously, all
the combustion modes are possible for the same accident
scenario depending on the available gas composition,
geometry, operating safety systems (e.g. spray, cooler, PAR,
venting), and the prevailing thermal hydraulic conditions
(e.g. pressure, temperature, turbulence). Starting as a slow
hydrogen deflagration near the ignition point, the hydrogen
flame can be strongly accelerated if favourable conditions
are encountered along its pathway. Therefore, independent
from the combustion regime present at the ignition location,
the severity of a hydrogen explosion is related to the
propagation speed of the deflagration. The experimental
results summarized in [26] states that the detonability range
which is usually given in text books to be 18-59 vol% of
hydrogen concentration in air may drastically change
depending on the system size. In the Russian large scale RUT
test facility, a lower detonability limit of as low as 12.5 vol%
has been observed [26]. The presence of an additional
component in the hydrogen-air gas mixture may further
influence the detonability range. In a Committee on the
Safety of Nuclear Installations report [27], it is reported that
an addition of CO to hydrogen-air mixtures increases the
detonation sensitivity for a particular hydrogen
concentration. At room temperature, a hydrogen-air mixture
containing 10 vol% hydrogen will not detonate, but an
addition of 5 vol% CO will convert this hydrogen-air mixture
into a detonable mixture. Therefore, it is of utmost
importance to consider potential admixtures that can be
present in the gas while analyzing hydrogen combustion
behavior and the associated safety measures.
Hydrogen safety issues received significant importance
following the Three Mile Island accident in 1979. Several ef-
forts were initiated to identify and evaluate safety concerns
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case of the Three Mile Island accident [28], out of 460 kg of (in-
vessel) hydrogen generated, approximately 270 kg was
released into the containment building. The pressure spike
of about 2 bar was produced by hydrogen burning in the air-
filled containment. The relatively large containment volume
(~80,000 m3) and high design pressure were effective in
mitigating the consequences of hydrogen generation. In case
of a severe accident, a similar amount of hydrogen is
generated inside a Mark 1 containment, which has a
combined drywell and wetwell gas volume of approximately
8,000 m3 [7] can produce detrimental effects if favorable
conditions for an explosion are encountered. In the
Fukushima accident, different processes were found to be
responsible for hydrogen explosions in reactor Units 1-4. For
Fukushima Daiichi Units 1 and 3, the reactor buildings were
damaged due to the hydrogen explosions. On the other
hand, an explosion did not occur in the reactor building at
the Fukushima Daiichi Unit 2. This is suggested to be due to
the open blowout panel on the top floor of the reactor
building that facilitated ventilation of the accumulated
hydrogen from Unit 2. Regarding hydrogen explosion in Unit
4 reactor building, a recent analysis performed by Nuclear
Regulatory Authority (NRA) in Japan concluded that a
hydrogen mass of about 400 kg would have been required
for the explosion occurred in the upper part of the reactor
building. Such a large quantity of hydrogen is unlikely to be
produced by the radiolysis of water in the spent fuel pool of
the Unit 4. The most probable reason for hydrogen explosion
in the Unit 4 has been associated to the potential
accumulation of hydrogen that flowed into the building
through SGTS ducts during venting operation of the
neighboring Unit 3 [2,29].
Analysis of hydrogen explosions performed by Japan Nu-
clear Energy Safety organization for Units 1 and 3 demon-
strated the influence of hydrogen transport and distribution
behaviour on the observed explosions [30]. About 400 kg of
hydrogen in top floor of the Unit 1 reactor building (via top
flange of the primary containment vessel) and about 1000 kg
of hydrogen in lower part of the reactor building of Unit 3
were assumed to be released. The predicted hydrogen
distribution in Unit 1 was stratified with highest
concentration of 20 vol % in the top floor and uniformly
distributed hydrogen with about 16e17 vol % hydrogen from
lowermost floor to the top floor of the reactor building for
Unit 3, well reproduced the observed sideward explosion in
Unit 1 and vertical explosion with higher intensity in Unit 3.
The predicted hydrogen concentrations in Units 1 and 3
were sufficient to induce fast hydrogen deflagration or even
deflagration-to-detonation transition. Flame acceleration or
transition from deflagration-to-detonation can also occur
at relatively low flame speed and H2 concentrations
depending on the available geometric and thermal-hydraulic
boundary conditions, hydrogen distribution and ignition
location. Multi-compartment H2 deflagration experiments
conducted in 640 m3 Battelle Model Containment (BMC)
facility [31] demonstrated that flame acceleration is
also possible at H2 concentration as low as 9-10 vol %
depending on initial pressure, steam concentration, and
geometry of compartments. The flame acceleration withoutany symptoms of detonation occurred due to jet ignition
effect produced by prevalence of a specific distribution of
hydrogen and geometry of the vent in the connected
compartments. The estimated flame speed was about 250 m/
s resulting into high local over-pressure with its maximum
close to the adiabatic-isochoric pressure.
The effect of ignition location and gas distribution on
hydrogen deflagration behavior (limited to flame propagation
speed below 10 m/s) has been investigated in the THAI facility
with a test series of 29 experiments [32]. For example, test HD-
24 was to investigate hydrogen deflagration behavior in a
premixed gas atmosphere containing 10 vol % hydrogen and
47 vol % saturated steam. Test HD-24 is compared to tests
HD-25 e HD-29, which were performed with initial
temperature stratification and steam concentration
distribution according to saturation at the respective
temperatures. Hydrogen concentration (stratified and non-
stratified) varied between 6 and 12 vol %, and the burn
direction was either upward or downward. For the test cases
with stratification, upper half of the vessel was filled with
47 vol % steam, the lower half contained about 3 vol %
steam. Hydrogen was injected at lower and middle locations
to adjust the specified hydrogen gradient. The target
temperatures were regulated by steam injection in the upper
half of the vessel and by cooling down the lower and middle
vessel mantles. Test configuration and qualitative
distribution of hydrogen and steam along the vessel height
is shown in Fig. 2. Initial thermal hydraulic conditions and
the test results (maximum pressure and residual hydrogen
concentration after deflagration) are presented in Table 1.
Based on the test results, the limit concentration for
downward flame propagation was determined to be 8.7 vol %
H2 in air (at 1.5 bar and 20 C gas temperature) and 12 vol % H2
in a steam-air mixture containing 47 vol % saturated steam (at
1.5 bar and 90 C). The comparison between tests HD-24 and
HD-26 which were performed with the same mean hydrogen
concentration show that flame propagation is supported by
the gas mixture with higher density in the lower half and
lower density in the upper half. The steep and higher pressure
rise and complete hydrogen combustion in the test with
density gradient (HD-26) in comparison to the test with initial
homogenous density (HD-24) supports this conclusion about
faster flame speed. Large portions of unburnt gas mixture
were displaced by flame induced convection during the
deflagration, particularly in the tests with upward burn di-
rection. Hydrogen deflagration induced mixing effects turn
originally non-flammable mixture into flammable (test HD-
28). In case of downward burn direction, the convection effect
is weak and combustion stops when the flame front enters
into a mixture which is not burnable for downward burn di-
rection, e. g. test HD-29. By increasing the mean hydrogen
concentration to 11 vol % (HD-25) as compared to 9 vol % (HD-
29) and the higher completeness of combustion resulted into
faster flame speed and much higher peak pressure.
Investigations related to gas transport and mixing in a
containment building are important thermal-hydraulic phe-
nomena to determine hydrogen-related risks [33]. The
prediction of hydrogen distribution behavior under
postulated severe accident conditions is required not only to
develop adequate accident management procedures but also
Fig. 2 e THAI hydrogen deflagration tests: Test configuration (left) and representation of the initial hydrogen and steam
distribution along the vessel height (right). THAI, thermal hydraulics, hydrogen, aerosols, and iodine.
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loads resulting from a combustion event. It is possible that the
global pressure rise is below some certain safety level for a
containment, but local loads that are more sensitive to
hydrogen distribution are capable of seriously damaging
specific containment components, internal walls, and safety
equipment [34].
Prediction of hydrogen distribution under prevailing ther-
mal-hydraulic conditions and the degree of turbulence level
during an accident in the reactor containment remains one of
the important safety concerns to be investigated in detail both
experimentally as well as by the use of lumped parameter (LP)
or computational fluid dynamic (CFD) codes to develop con-
fidence in prediction capabilities. In this context, a large
number of gas distribution and mixing experiments [35e38]
have been performed in the THAI test facility. The objective of
these tests was an in-depth investigation of gas distribution
and gas mixing in homogeneous and stratified atmospheres,
stratification break-up by means of natural convection, fan
jets, and steam jets. Density stratification was achieved by
establishing a light gas cloud of steam/air, He/air or H2/N2-
mixtures in the upper vessel plenum. Additionally,Table 1 e Initial test conditions and the results of THAI hydro
stratified gas atmospheres; initial pressure 1.5 bar (absolute) f
Initial test conditions
Test ID Stratification Bum direction Hydrogen c
vo
Upper half
HD-24 Homogeneous Upward 10
HD-26 Temperature/steam Upward 10
HD-27 Temperature/hydrogen Upward 12
HD-28 Temperature/hydrogen Upward 6
HD-29 Temperature/hydrogen Downward 12
HD-25 Temperature/hydrogen Downward 12experiments with systematically increased complexity were
designed with the objective of providing detailed data about
the flow pattern, turbulence, condensation, gas velocities, gas
concentration distribution, and dissolution time of light gas
cloud for the development and validation of advanced LP- and
CFD- codes. This required a sophisticated instrumentation
and data processing system to provide the experimental data
with the necessary timely and spatial resolution to satisfy the
requirements of advanced analytical tools. Fig. 3 shows
schematics of the selected gas distribution experiments
conducted in THAI and the main investigated phenomena.
The systematic performance of THAI gas distribution ex-
periments allowed determination of the efficiency of natural
or forced convections for mixing of a stratified atmosphere.
Test results indicate that complete mixing of the stratified gas
atmosphere by natural or forced convections may last over a
time span ranging from a few minutes to a few hours
depending on the strength of light gas layer and characteris-
tics of a gas mixing source (momentum dominated or buoy-
ancy driven). Comparison between the THAI tests TH22 and
TH24 indicated that at the comparable vertical wall temper-
ature different (i.e. equal mixing source strength), the erosiongen deflagration tests conducted in homogenous and
or all tests.
Results
oncentration
l %
Maximum
pressure, bar
Residual hydrogen after
deflagration event vol %
Lower half
4.2 0
10 4.6 0
6 4.0 ~ 1.1
12 3.6 ~ 1.65
6 3.3 0.4 (Lower half/4.4 (upper half)
10 5.3 0 (Lower half 0.8 (upper half)
Fig. 3 e THAI gas distribution tests on gas distribution and stratification break-up. THAI, thermal hydraulics, hydrogen,
aerosols, and iodine.
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comparable helium air cloud. The faster erosion can be
attributed to the lower density difference between air and
steam compared to air and helium. Analysis of the THAI ex-
periments carried out with LP- or CFD-codes also demon-
strated that a realistic prediction of the pressure transient is
only possible if a reliable model has been considered to ac-
count for steam condensation on walls and wall heat-up.
Use of PARs is one of the established strategies to mitigate
the possible hydrogen risk during design basis or severe ac-
cident conditions inside nuclear reactor containments.
Generally, a commercial PAR unit is an open-ended vertical
channel equipped with catalytic material in the lower part. In
case of an accident with hydrogen release, hydrogen enters
most of the units already diluted and premixed with air.
Hydrogen molecules react with oxygen on the catalyst sur-
face, generating heat and water vapor. The buoyancy of the
hot gas and the height of the vertical channel (chimney)
ensure continuous flow through the PAR unit.
PARs are available in various designs utilizing different
materials and forms of catalysts. The majority of the PAR
vendors utilize platinum or palladium as catalyst material
coated on a base material in the form of plates or pellets.
However, PAR designs have also been based on catalyst forms
other than plate or pellet, such as the PAR design developed in
Korea, which is equipped with a honeycomb catalyst [39] and
another PAR design developed by a Russian institute includes
hydrophobic catalyst on porous metal carrier to allow PAR
functioning in high concentration range of hydrogen [40].
There has been extensive deployment of PARs in PWR
containments both for controlling the long-term release of
radiolytic hydrogen as well as much greater amounts of
hydrogen produced by a metal-water reaction during core
degradation in severe accidents. Even though a limited
amount of information is available in the public domain about
PAR performance behavior in BWR containments, the range of
investigated parameters as well as accident scenariosconsidered during investigations have not been as extensive
as for PAR application in PWRs.
Regarding BWR specific conditions, PAR performance
behavior under low O2 concentrations and its interaction with
surrounding atmosphere are desirable. The data can be suit-
able for validation and development of empirical correlations
used for PAR capacity calculation as well as for containment
codes based on the LP or CFD approach to allow an accurate
prediction of hydrogen generation and distribution behavior
under an extended range of accident scenarios. Furthermore,
in the wake of the Fukushima accident, installation of PARs
inside a reactor building is considered. Depending on the ac-
cident sequence and release timings, the hydrogen-steam gas
mixture entering from a primary containment vessel to the
reactor building may evolve differently than primary
containment vessel. A reactor building that is initially at
ambient pressure and temperature conditions will condense
out steam from the gas mixture. The distribution of hydrogen
gas inside a reactor building will also be significantly influ-
enced by the flow regimes of the gas release at the location of
the not-so-well-defined leakages or openings on the periphery
of the primary containment vessel. Therefore, experimental
investigations on PAR performance behavior may also be
required for new issues arising due to PAR application in BWR
reactor buildings, e.g., PAR-induced ignition behavior, impact
of flow regimes of gas release emerging out from primary
containment vessel, PAR performance in inhomogeneous gas
mixtures, and impact of PAR location with respect to a
hydrogen release source.
Some of the above-mentioned issues have been considered
during extensive PAR testing carried out in the frame of Or-
ganization for Economic Co-operation and Development
(OECD) THAI and THAI 2 projects [19,20,32,41]. The tests con-
ducted in the THAI test facility considered different available
PAR designs based on plate-type catalysts (provided by AREVA
GmbH, Germany and AECL, Canada), and pellet-type catalyst
(provided by NIS Ingenieurgesellschaft mbH, Germany). A
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and ignition behavior considered during the tests included:
initial pressure between 1.0 bar and 3.0 bar, initial gas tem-
perature between ambient and 117 C; atmosphere steam
content of 0e60 vol %; PAR performance under very low O2
concentration; and PAR overload by high hydrogen concen-
tration. Tests have been conducted in an initially air-filled
atmosphere. The specified initial temperature, pressure and
gas composition (steam/air) have been regulated by means of
vessel walls heating and controlled gas injections. In the
initial test phase, PAR onset behavior was investigated by
establishing first a slow release of hydrogen (0.15 g/s) and
immediately after onset of hydrogen recombination hydrogen
release has been increased to 0.3 g/s to determine long-term
PAR performance behavior.
In principle, the performance behaviour of the three
investigated PARs varied within a narrow range. Some dif-
ferences occurred due to specific design features, such as gas
velocity and gas residence time between the catalyst elements
inside the PAR depend on the chimney height of the respective
PAR design. One specific feature of the Pellet type PARwas the
expulsion of glowing particles from the PAR outlet into the
vessel atmosphere in case of heavy catalyst load. This visible
effect was connected with a significant additional H2-O2 re-
action which supports hydrogen recombination by the PAR.
For the complete PAR performance test series that included
30 tests, test results indicate that the volumetric hydrogen
concentration required for the onset of hydrogen recombi-
nation by PARs varies from 0.2 vol% to 4.4 vol% depending on
temperature, pressure, and steam content. Dry atmosphere,
elevated pressure and temperature promoted early recombi-
nation onset. Steam-saturated conditions resulted in delayed
onset. An immediate start-up of hydrogen recombination ac-
tivity by PAR was also confirmed in an atmosphere containing
O2 as low as 0.5 vol% [19,20].
The long-term PAR performance behavior has been deter-
mined based on the amount of hydrogen recombinedmass per
unit time (recombination rate) and hydrogen depletion effi-
ciency (defined as H2 concentration difference between PAR
inlet and outlet divided by H2 concentration at PAR inlet). Test0
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Fig. 4 e Recombination rate at 4 vol% H2/0 % steam contentresults indicate that hydrogen recombination rate by the PAR
increases nearly proportional to the hydrogen concentration
and to the operation pressure. Hydrogen recombination at
4 vol% hydrogen concentration in dry gas mixtures as a
function of pressure is given in Fig. 4. PAR continued to
recombine hydrogen even after volumetric oxygen
concentration had been reduced below 0.5 vol % in the
vessel atmosphere.
Hydrogen depletion efficiency at a given hydrogen con-
centration is also PAR-design specific as it mainly depends on
the gas residence time in the PAR catalyst zone and on the
diffusion length from the vertically flowing gas to the catalyst
surface (and probably also on catalyst material). For the three
investigated PAR designs, the hydrogen depletion efficiency
was found to be insensitive to the steam content and varied
between 40% and 60% in an atmosphere containing sufficient
oxygen surplus. A decrease in depletion efficiency with
increasing pressure was observed, which may have occurred
due to the increase of gas diffusion resistance along the
catalyst boundary layer with pressure.
Regarding PAR performance under oxygen starvation
conditions, the test results provide evidence that an oxygen-
to-hydrogen ratio higher than stoichiometric is required for
PAR to operate at design capacity. Aminimumoxygen surplus
factor Ф (defined as 2  O2 concentration at PAR inlet/H2
concentration at PAR inlet) between 2 and 3 depending on the
PAR types but independent from individual test conditions is
necessary to ensure unimpaired PAR performance. This is
significantly higher than the stoichiometric ratio (Ф ¼ 1). For
smaller values of Ф, the hydrogen recombination rate,
hydrogen depletion efficiency, and catalyst temperature
decrease drastically. AtФ¼ 1, the PAR capacity falls below 50%
of the design capacity. The effect of oxygen starvation can be
clearly demonstrated by the fact that as long as sufficient
oxygen is available recombination rate increases almost lin-
early with hydrogen concentration at the PAR inlet and
therefore, the quotient of recombination rate divided by
hydrogen concentration should be approximately constant.
As soon as critical oxygen surplus ratio is reached, quotient
decreases significantly. The aforesaid transition in quotient of2.25 2.5 2.75 3 3.25
ure    bar
pe PAR
at the PAR inlet. PAR, passive autocatalytic recombiner.
Nu c l E n g T e c h n o l 4 7 ( 2 0 1 5 ) 1 1e2 5 19hydrogen recombination rate divided by hydrogen concen-
tration with respect to oxygen surplus ratio at critical oxygen
surplus ratio (between 2 and 3) is depicted in Fig. 5 for pellet-
type PAR as an example. The test was started with air-filled
atmosphere and oxygen starvation condition was produced
by injection of N2 into the atmosphere.
For accident scenarios with excessive hydrogen release
rates, some of the PAR units in the containment can become
overloaded and reach extremely high operation temperatures,
which may cause an ignition of the steam-air- hydrogen at-
mosphere. THAI experiments show that a PAR loaded by >
5.5 vol% hydrogen in dry atmosphere and > 8 vol% in wet at-
mosphere (containing > 45 vol% steam), and an oxygen sur-
plus ratio > 2 (in initially air-filled atmosphere), ignites the
hydrogen-air-steam atmosphere in a reproducible way. Test
data indicate that ignition is directly correlated with the PAR
catalyst surface temperature. The highest recorded catalyst
surface temperatures at the time of ignition were in the range
of 890e920 C (dry atmosphere) and 960e1005 C (wet atmo-
sphere). The course and strength of a hydrogen deflagration
initiated by PAR ignition depends on the available gas
composition nearby the PAR outlet as well as gas distribution
in the vessel. The test data indicate that for the PAR induced
convective flows, hydrogen flame propagation occurs always
in the upward direction commencing at PAR outlet. Inlet
hydrogen concentrations at which PAR tends to ignite are
lower than theminimumhydrogen concentration required for
downward burn (8.7 vol% H2 in dry mixture and 12 vol% H2 in
wet mixture). The THAI test data did not indicate any flame
acceleration under investigated test conditions. However, as
discussed earlier in this paper, flame acceleration can occur
due to turbulence, geometry, presence of obstacles, and wall
roughness [31,34].
Optimal performance of PARs is ensured if the recombi-
nation capacity of a catalyst material is not degraded either
due to long time operation or due to the presence of impurities
in the hydrogen carrying feed gas through the PAR. Regardless
of the form of catalyst system employed, all PARs have a0.00
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Fig. 5 e H2 recombination rate reduction by oxygen scertain amount of active catalyst surface area available for
recombination of hydrogen and oxygen. As the catalyst itself
does not take part in the reaction, it become available for
further recombination. The catalyst provides a suitable sur-
face for the absorption of hydrogen and oxygen atoms and for
desorption of the recombination product steam to surround-
ing gas. The presence of certain impurities can have an
adverse impact on the catalyst functioning by blocking the
active catalyst surface. These impurities are considered as
poisons for the PAR. Data about poisoning effects on PAR in
the open literature are sparse as most of these investigations
have been carried out by PAR vendors and results are pro-
prietary. Nevertheless, information available in the open
literature clearly indicates that the poisoning effect on a PAR
is very application specific and can be influenced by a number
of factors, such as poison types, their concentrations, and the
temperature of catalyst surface at the time of interaction with
potential poisons, etc. The effect is detrimental if potential
poisons reach the catalyst surface prior to the arrival of
hydrogen (cold surface interaction) as compared to the arrival
of potential poisons after the onset of PAR activity (hot surface
interaction). In the case of a hot catalyst surface, the poisoning
effect is less severe, which may be due to a positive thermo-
phoresis effect and/or possible dissociation of poisonous
chemical compounds into less harmful by-products at high
temperatures. In this regard, previous experimental research
on CO interaction with PAR has shown that CO is recombined
into CO2 at a temperature of 85 C implying that no poisoning
of the investigated PAR had occurred at 85 C. PAR tests on CO
poisoning conducted in the KALI test facility also indicated no
degradation of PAR capacity in the presence of 3 vol% CO and
4.5 vol% hydrogen [27]. However, it should be noted that, in
most of the previous research studies, the catalyst surfaces
were already hot as hydrogen was injected first, followed by
the release of CO. Regarding CO poisoning the worst
scenario can be considered if CO reaches PAR surfaces in the
cold state. Such a scenario may potentially occur during the
late phase of an accident with the release of hydrogen/6.0 7.0 8.0 9.0 10.0 11.0 12.0
s ratio    -
Initial test conditions
1.5 bar, 74 °C, 25 vol % steam
test starts with sufficient O surplus 
tarvation. PAR, passive autocatalytic recombiner.
Nu c l E n g T e c h n o l 4 7 ( 2 0 1 5 ) 1 1e2 520steam/CO mixture to a PAR installed inside BWR reactor
building. Another potential scenario might be PAR exposure
to CO under oxygen starvation conditions as PAR catalyst
temperatures will cease to rise in the absence of sufficient
oxygen.
In the context of PARpoisoning, oneof thePARexperiments
conducted in the THAI facility was designed to investigate the
poisoning effects of fission products on PAR performance.
Challenging test conditions which are conceivable during a
severe accident were established. Subjected conditions for the
test included PAR exposure to fission products at very low inlet
H2 concentration (< 2 vol %), elevated average concentration in
the range of about 3e4 g/m3 of realistic aerosol mixture (hy-
groscopic and inert aerosols), molecular iodine present at a
concentration of 1.7E-6 g/l and saturated steam conditions
prevailing inside the test vessel. Test phases were defined to
ensure that fissionproducts arrive at PAR inlet before the onset
of hydrogen recombination occurs. Test results showed that
even under such challenging conditions, PAR hydrogen
depletion efficiency remained unaffected and comparable to
the results of the other PAR tests with the identical thermal-
hydraulic conditions butwithout aerosols and iodine, i.e in the
range of 50e60%. Also, the onset of recombination occurred at
the same PAR inlet hydrogen concentration as for other PAR-
tests with comparable thermal hydraulic conditions but
without fissionproducts.Apparently, the effect of aerosols and
iodine on PAR performance is not significant.
3.2. Fission product issues
Environmental measurements made during the Fukushima
accident indicated that a significant fraction of radionuclides
was released to the environment. The volatile radionuclides,
such as noble gas xenon-133 and aerosol bound cesium-137,
released from Fukushima units to the environment have been
estimated using the containment source termproduced by the
degrading reactor core, and by using the atmospheric disper-
sion models with an input of environmental monitoring from
outside the plant. Based on several analyses it has beenwidely
reported that the entire noble gas inventory of reactor Units 1-
3 was released into the atmosphere [42,43]. The reported
amount of the released cesium-137 varies between 10 PBq and
40 PBq [2,42e45]. The uncertainties of these estimates in the
individual studies cited in the report [45] reflect a wide
variation in emission monitoring data and deficiencies in
the respective modelling approaches. Fission product source
terms from the Fukushima reactors have been identified as
one the major sources of error for model prediction of the
radionuclide release into the atmosphere. The estimation of
the radionuclides released proved uncertain not only due to
limited knowledge about accident scenario and release
locations to the environment but also because of
uncertainties in quantifying fission product retention and
release behavior in the primary and secondary containments.
In case of a severe accident, radioactive material released
from a BWR core due to overheating will arrive to the primary
containment vessel either in gaseous or aerosol form. In order
to get a precise determination of fission product source-terms
to the environment, it is of utmost importance that their
deposition and resuspension behavior inside containment iswell known. Furthermore, any potential impact of mitigation
measures, such as water spray, PAR, and FCVS, must be
known to assess fission product volatility, distribution, and
transport behavior inside the primary and secondary
containments.
In the case of the Fukushima accident, the possible sources
of radionuclides released to the atmosphere included venting
of Units 1-3, hydrogen explosions, and uncontrolled releases
fromdamaged fuel locatedwithin the spent fuel pool at Unit 4.
Venting in Units 1-3 was carried out from wetwell except in
Unit 2, where venting from drywell was once attempted for a
short time but stopped shortly after (within minutes) as dry-
well pressure continued increasing [1,2]. For the purpose of in-
containment source term reduction, Mark 1 containment
system design is equippedwith the pressure suppression pool
and additionally water sprays are installed in the drywell as
well as in thewetwell for containment heat removal during an
accident [7,46].
Due to the uncertainties associated with the release of
fission products into the environment, the Fukushima acci-
dent raised several questions and advocated additional
research activities regarding performance behavior of pres-
sure suppression pool as well as containment venting system
during accident progression. The reason behind the initiation
of these research activities has been, on one hand, to prepare
and enhance the technical/experimental basis for installing
the filtered venting systems or to develop new filtration tech-
nologies according to specific reactor requirements, and, on
the other hand, to reassess the potential of aerosol and iodine
retention in BWR suppressions pools. Moreover, new research
and development needs related to FCVS will be driven by the
requirement to confirm or demonstrate their reliability during
severe accident conditions as several issues related to in-
containment source-term and performance of different filter
designs will need to be assessed in light of the Fukushima
accident. Fig. 6 summarizes a list of potential topics related to
in-containment source-term investigation and FCVS.
In the above-mentioned context, experiments conducted
in the THAI test facility particularly related to the suppression
pool hydrodynamics, iodine mass transfer, iodine-aerosol
interaction, fission product wash-down from surfaces, iodine
retention in the sump, and aerosol re-suspension from a
boiling sump provide a valuable experimental database for
phenomena-orientated development and validation of safety
analysis codes [47e51].
The THAI experimental research conducted on BWR
related issues was focused on fluid-dynamic features pro-
duced by a gas/steam discharge in the suppression pool. One
of the test series investigated the development and break-up
of thermal stratification in the suppression pool. In the late
phase of an accident after the blowdown has taken place,
thermal stratification development in a pressure suppression
pool due to the release of steam at a low mass-flux can be
anticipated. Suppression pool thermal stratification may also
persist during extended station blackout accidents because no
active power is available to break the thermal stratification in
the suppression pool. Accurately predicting the pool stratifi-
cation phenomenon is important because it affects the peak
containment pressure and the fission product retention
capacity.
Fig. 6 e Potential topics dealing with in-containment source-term and FCVS. FCVS, filtered containment venting systems.
Nu c l E n g T e c h n o l 4 7 ( 2 0 1 5 ) 1 1e2 5 21To carry out pool thermal stratification experiments, the
THAI vessel was filled with water up to the elevation of 5.2 m,
making a water pool volume of 29 m3. The surface area of the
water pool was 7.82 m2. The experiments were performed
with the constant steam mass flux of 2.3 kg/m2s and initial
water pool temperature was varied between 10 C and 65 C.
The gas space above the water pool was filled with air at 2 bar
absolute pressure. During THAI tests with pure steam release
to the water pool via a DN 100 steel downcomer pipe it was
found that the vertical temperature profile in the warm water
layer above the release location is not uniform but shows a
positive gradient. As an example, Fig. 7 shows the
development of thermal stratification along the water pool
elevation over a time span of 9 h. Time t ¼ 0 h corresponds
to the initiation of steam injection.
By the start of steam injection, a thermal boundary layer
develops over the length of the downcomer's outer surface
due to heat conduction through the pipe wall. The stratifica-
tion process starts almost immediately above the downcomerFig. 7 e Temperature profiles in the water pool during toutlet after beginning of the steam injection. This effect is
caused by steam condensation inside the steel pipe, which
heats up the pipe and causes heat transfer from the outer pipe
wall to the water all over the submerged length of the pipe.
The buoyantwarmwater plume that rises along the outer pipe
wall is exposed to a two-dimensional heat source, the vertical
dimension of which leads to a vertical temperature gradient in
the pool water. Therefore, the condensation processes inside
the gas release channels and the associated conductive heat
transport to the water pool should be carefully considered in
analysis related to steam condensation behavior in the water
pools.
Results showed that the heating-up rates were higher at
the higher elevations of the water pool due to the occurrence
of maximum heat input by the rising warm water in the
boundary layer formed along the downcomer pipe wall. The
heat-up rate decreased over time due to the increasing tem-
perature of the water pool. Fig. 8 depicts an example of the
heating rate as a function of water pool elevation.he heating-up phase. Tw ¼ 40C, _ms ¼ 2.3 kg/m2s.
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Fig. 8 eWater pool heat up rate at different pool elevations, for Tw ¼ 10C, _ms ¼ 2.3 kg/m2s.
Nu c l E n g T e c h n o l 4 7 ( 2 0 1 5 ) 1 1e2 522The pool was kept thermally stratified and subsequently
the second test phase started with the initiation of water
spray. The objective of this test phase was to investigate the
potential for water spray on suppression pool mixing. The
spray water was injected at a constant flow rate of 12 Nm3/h.
The spray nozzle was located off-center and 3.1 m away from
the pool water surface. The spray-induced cooling of the
thermally stratified water pool for the test case using 2.3 kg/
m2s is shown in Fig. 9. During the spray operation, the water
pool becomes well mixed, thereby increasing progressively
downward the temperature of the cold water below the
downcomer pipe outlet in the water pool. The test results
indicate that the pool water was homogenously mixed
within about 1 hour. For the investigated range of the test
parameters, the cooling rate increased with a decrease in
the initial water pool temperature.
Another THAI test series investigated bubble-column
behavior in a water pool [51]. The investigated tests have high
relevance for pool scrubbing processes occurring in a water
pool. Pool scrubbing is a process that is essential not only in
the BWR pressure suppression pool, but it plays a vital role
in the core re-flood scenario or wet FCVS system based on2.0
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Fig. 9 e Spray induced water cool down and pooventuri scrubbers. The continuous release of steam and
noncondensable gases from the degraded reactor core
causes an atmospheric flow from the drywell via downcomer
pipes to the wetwell pool. Radioactive contaminants in this
flow are partly retained in the pool water by pool scrubbing.
The thermal-hydraulic environment that governs the
radioactivity retention processes is dominated by a bubble
column that rises from the submerged downcomer pipe
opening to the water surface. For carrying out the bubble-
column experiments, the THAI vessel was filled with water
up to the elevation of 5.2 m (corresponding to a water
volume of 29 m3). Tests were performed with a DN 100
downcomer and a submergence depth of 2 m. The test vessel
was at atmospheric pressure, and the initial temperature of
water in the pool was either 10 C or 46 C. Air and air-steam
mass flow rates were varied between 10 kg/h and 80 kg/h. A
high-speed camera (1,000 frames/s) was used to record the
formation and break-up behavior of bubbles at different
elevations.
The THAI test results indicate that the size of the primary
bubbles depends upon the downcomer pipe diameter and the
injected gas flow rate. A constant formation frequency of55 60 65
rature (°C)
9.4h9.5h9.6h9.7h9.8h
9.9h
10.0
0.1
Lower layer (history
from steam injection)
l mixing of a thermally stratified water pool.
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of test parameters. Once separated from the orifice, the pri-
mary bubbles begin to rise and decay simultaneously. At a
rising distance of about three times the primary bubble
diameter, the decay is complete. The diameters of the bubbles
near the water surface were estimated to be in the range of
3e4 mm, independent of the mass flow rate and the radial
position. The condensation of released steam and the corre-
sponding approach to saturation conditions is so fast that test
results on bubble decay for injection with and without steam
appear to be very similar. It should be noticed that part of the
injected steamwas already condensed on the inner wall of the
downcomer steel pipe. Apart from steam condensation
behavior, the bubble column causes a recirculating water flow
in the pool, which contributes to the rising velocity of the
bubbles and reduces the gas-water contact time that is rele-
vant for the fission product retention. These thermal-hy-
draulic processes require a proper description by means of
engineering correlations suitable for use in pool scrubbing
simulation codes.
Bubble dynamics also plays a vital role in wet resuspension
of the fission products from water pools, if containment
venting is activated during an accident. Generally, for BWRs
wetwell venting with the suppression pool temperature being
below saturation is the preferred option because it provides an
additional benefit of scrubbing fission products [21]. However,
during a severe accident, water in the pressure suppression
pool or in the wet FCVS can start to boil in the case of
extreme heating (by core melt) or in the case of rapid
depressurization (due to containment venting). The steam
bubbles bursting at the surface of the boiling pool generate a
large number of very small droplets containing the same
fission product concentration as the pool water in the case of
soluble aerosols. However, in the case of an insoluble aerosol,
concentrations in water pool and entrained droplets may
differ significantly. The REST (REsuspension Source Term)
experiments [52], for example, dealt with a mixture of soluble
and insoluble aerosols in which the aerosol concentration for
insoluble material (mass median diameter ¼ 0.65 mm with
geometric standard deviation of 1.7) in droplets was
measured 20 times higher than the aerosol concentration in
the water pool. Thus, wet resuspension by entrainment of
droplets from water bodies containing suspended or solved
fission products can have a significant contribution to the
late phase source term during severe accidents.
In the THAI tests wet resuspension of fission products from
the sump water has been simulated by soluble aerosols (CsCl
and KI salts) and by non-soluble suspension of calcium car-
bonate (primary mass-median diameters of 0.065 mm and
0.9 mm). Resuspension was effected by injecting steam at the
bottom of the sump. The investigated superficial velocities
ranged from 0.024 m/s to 0.13 m/s with higher values repre-
senting churn turbulent flow regime. A decreasing trend of the
resuspension fraction for insoluble particles was found as the
superficial velocity increases. The effect of primary particle
sizes on the resuspension fraction was found to be rather
small compared to the effect of the superficial velocity. The
largest values obtained at superficial velocity of 0.024 m/s
were approximately 4.1E-4 and reduce to 1.9E-5 for high su-
perficial velocities of about 0.13 m/s. Test results indicate thatmainly very small aerosols in the submicron range are
released from a boiling pool, which in turn might remain
airborne for a long time.
Fine particles in the submicron range are difficult to
remove by water sprays andmetal fiber filters and may pose a
challenge in providing high decontamination factors. Another
possible scenario generating fine particles in the late phase of
an accident is revolatization [53] of the deposited fission
products. Revolatization of the fission products can be
caused by several mechanisms, such as mechanical loads
from hydrogen deflagration, elevated temperatures due to
decay heat, heat transfer from the flow emanating from the
pressure vessel, or even by chemical reactions. In the wake
of Fukushima, as passive operation of FCVS is desired for >
24 hours [21], details on aerosol characteristics, such as mass
concentration and particle size distribution as a function of
aerosol types (soluble, insoluble, or hygroscopic), at the time
of venting are desired for performance testing of FCVS in
order to ensure reliable attenuation of fission product source
term to the environment. Additionally, interaction of one or
more accident processes during an accident, such as
hydrogen combustion and fission product distribution, may
need to be studied by means of large-scale experiments to
enhance the predictive capabilities of safety analysis codes.4. Conclusion
The Fukushima accident involved considerable core melting
and subsequently generated large source terms of radionu-
clides to the environment. In the aftermath of the Fukushima
accident, action plans prepared by regulatory bodies in many
countries included assess the NPP accident management
provisions and important severe accident phenomena related
to hydrogen and fission product issues. The lessons learned
from the Fukushima accident have triggered international
research activities related to hydrogen mitigation measures,
pool scrubbing in BWR suppression pools, and performance
analysis of filtered containment venting systems. A number of
safety relevant processes remain to be investigated in detail to
understand the processes as well as to validate the safety
analysis tools, where data needed for model validation are
lacking.
In the light of the Fukushima accident, additional experi-
mental as well as analytical needs identified for hydrogen,
such as hydrogen distribution in condensing atmosphere,
hydrogen deflagration-to-detonation behavior in the presence
of obstacles, and inhomogeneous gas composition and fission
products related issues, such as water pool hydrodynamics,
fission product scrubbing in water pools under a wide spec-
trum of accident relevant flow regimes, and potential influ-
ence of chemical boundary conditions on fission product
retention or release behaviour from water pools should be
investigated in conjunction with retrofitting of mitigations
systems, such as PARs and FCVSs.
The specific issues related to hydrogen and fission prod-
ucts as identified during the Fukushima accident will need
further investigation to mitigate potential severe nuclear
reactor accident related risks effectively. Additionally, the
enlarged experimental database on issues raised by
Nu c l E n g T e c h n o l 4 7 ( 2 0 1 5 ) 1 1e2 524Fukushima will support enhancement of the predictive ca-
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